Independent inspection of hardware collateral
Is the collateral what the loan documents say it is, today?
Innovation Blockchain is preparing an independent inspection service for hardware that secures loans, starting with GPUs behind AI-compute credit. An inspector checks the facility and the documents against a written standard.
The result is a signed report, and a short proof record that a lending contract can check before it releases a draw.
StatusAs at 22 November 2026
- Service
- Pilot preparationNo client engagement has been carried out yet.
- Inspection standard
- Version 0.1, draft for reviewProposed numbers are marked as proposed.
- On-chain part
- Prototype for Flare's Coston2 testnetInvented data. Not deployed yet. Not in production.
- Flare Confidential Compute
- Not on Flare mainnetFlare has published no date.
01 The service
What the inspection answers
A lender who finances GPUs needs to know five things, at funding and for the life of the loan.
- The hardware on the collateral schedule exists.
- It is the hardware that was paid for, unit by unit.
- It sits where the loan documents say it sits.
- It is powered, cooled and running.
- Nobody else has a competing claim that the lender has not been told about.
The inspection standard turns those five questions into repeatable procedures. It is written so that a lender, a borrower and a second inspector would each reach the same result from the same facility.
Each inspection produces two things. The first is a signed report with a findings register and an evidence index. The second is a proof record: a few fields that state the result and how long it stays valid, with no client name and no private data.
Who it is for
| Reader | What the inspection gives them |
|---|---|
| GPU lenders and private-credit funds | An independent check of the collateral before the first draw, then a periodic re-verification while the loan is outstanding. Findings are reported as facts and exceptions, each with an owner and a due date. |
| Loan buyers | A funding inspection before a loan is sold to a new holder, to the same standard and with the sampling disclosed. |
| Verification and telemetry vendors | A field partner. Hardware attestation confirms that a device is genuine and which device it is. It does not confirm who owns it or where it is. The site visit and the document checks cover that part. |
| GPU operators | A known list of inputs and procedures before fieldwork starts, and one report that states what was checked and how. |
02 The standard
The inspection standard, in summary
This is a summary of the GPU Collateral Inspection Standard, version 0.1, a draft for review. Numbers marked proposed are starting defaults. They are to be tested with lenders and fixed in version 0.2.
Read the longer summary of the standard
Procedures
- 6.1
Document reconciliation
Every serial on the collateral schedule is matched to an invoice line, a bill-of-materials line and the security filing schedule.
- 6.2
System-read identity
GPU serials are read from the running systems in a session the inspector controls or directly observes. The raw output is saved and hashed at capture. Where the hardware supports it, the manufacturer's hardware attestation is collected.
- 6.3
Physical inspection
Every rack is walked. Chassis serials are checked against the schedule, to the sample size below, and each checked chassis is photographed. The inspector looks for units that are present but not working.
- 6.4
Location and custody
The site, suite and cage are confirmed against the loan documents. The facility operator confirms occupancy in writing, directly to the inspector.
- 6.5
Power and cooling
Contracted power is compared with the demand of the scheduled hardware. Measured draw and the cooling method are recorded.
- 6.6
Competing claims
The facility operator is asked in writing whether the account is current and whether it asserts a lien. Search results from the lender's counsel are recorded. Counsel interprets them.
- 6.7
Operating evidence
Utilisation and uptime records are reviewed for the previous 30 days proposed. Contract coverage is recorded as a ratio. Customer names and prices stay private.
- 6.8
Insurance
The certificate is current, covers the scheduled hardware at the inspected address, and names the lender as the loan documents require.
Engagement types
| Code | Type | When |
|---|---|---|
| F | Funding inspection | Before the first draw, or before a loan is sold to a new holder |
| Q | Periodic re-verification | Every quarter proposed while the loan is outstanding |
| E | Event inspection | After a trigger, such as hardware moved, a change of serial, or a missed colocation payment |
Sampling
| Check | Coverage |
|---|---|
| System-read serials | 100% of scheduled GPUs |
| Rack walk | 100% of racks |
| Chassis-level physical check | 100% up to 50 chassis. Above that, 50 plus 10% of the remainder proposed |
| Test workload | 5% of chassis, minimum 5 proposed |
The inspector picks the sample on the day. The operator never picks it. Any mismatch in a sample moves that check to 100%.
Findings ratings
Each finding has a reference, a description, the evidence it rests on, a proposed correction, an owner and a due date.
| Rating | Meaning | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| The collateral is not as represented, or cannot be verified | Scheduled units missing. A serial mismatch that is not explained. The site differs from the loan documents. The operator asserts a lien. Access refused. | |
| Verified, but with a gap that needs correction by a date | A warranty replacement not yet reflected in the schedule. An insurance certificate out of date. Power headroom below contract. | |
| Verified with no exception |
The overall result is Pass, Pass with exceptions (Amber only) or Fail (any open Red).
The report
- Cover: facility, loan reference, engagement type, inspection dates, inspector
- Scope, and anything that could not be done and why
- Result, with a count table: scheduled, system-read matched, physically sighted, exceptions
- Findings register
- Evidence index
- Statement of independence
- SHA-256 hash of the report and of the evidence bundle, with a timestamp
03 The proof
How the proof works
There are four steps: inspect, report, prove, gate. The first two need no blockchain. The last two are the prototype.
The same four steps in words
- 1
Inspect
The inspector follows the standard at the facility and against the documents.
- 2
Report
The inspector issues the signed report. The report and its evidence bundle are hashed. Both stay off-chain, held under confidentiality.
- 3
Prove
In the design, private inputs, such as leases, customer names and coverage, are checked inside a Flare Confidential Compute extension. Only the result is published: pass, pass with exceptions, or fail, with a valid-until date.
- 4
Gate
A lending contract reads the proof record. It refuses a draw when the proof is failed or stale.
The proof record
The record is short and machine-readable, so that a contract can check it without reading the report. It carries no client name, no site name and no private data. Its format has no Flare-specific fields, so it stays chain-neutral.
| Field | Content |
|---|---|
| Facility ID | A pseudonym. No client or site name |
| Schedule hash | Hash of the collateral schedule inspected |
| Engagement type | F, Q or E |
| Inspection date | The date of the inspection |
| Counts | Scheduled, matched, exceptions |
| Result | Pass, Pass with exceptions, or Fail |
| Valid until | A funding inspection is valid for 90 days proposed. After the date, the record is stale |
| Report hash | SHA-256 hash of the signed report |
| Inspector signature | The inspector's signature over the record |
Sample record. Every value is invented.
{
"facilityId": "fac-7c1e",
"scheduleHash": "0x5f2a...e91b",
"engagementType": "F",
"inspectionDate": "2026-12-10",
"counts": { "scheduled": 1024, "matched": 1024, "exceptions": 0 },
"result": "PASS",
"validUntil": "2027-03-10",
"reportHash": "0x9ab4...03cd",
"inspectorSignature": "0x..."
}
What the lending contract does
This is the behaviour of the prototype's mock loan facility. It holds no token. The credit limit and the drawn amount are plain numbers.
| State of the proof | A draw is |
|---|---|
| Pass, within its valid-until date | Allowed, up to the credit limit |
| Pass with exceptions, within its valid-until date | Refused by default. The owner of the mock facility can set it to allow a draw. Whether it should is an open question |
| Fail | Refused |
| Past its valid-until date | Refused. Stale is treated the same as Fail |
| No record | Refused |
Confidentiality is the design. It has not been demonstrated.
In the design, the private inputs are checked inside an enclave run under Flare Confidential Compute, and only the signed result leaves it.
The prototype's demo uses a test machine with no enclave. Whoever runs it can read the private file. The demo is built to show the gate working from end to end, and it has not been run end to end yet. It cannot show confidentiality, and this site does not claim that it does.
Flare describes Confidential Compute in its developer documentation.
04 Limits
What it is not
The inspection is a set of agreed procedures carried out by an independent inspector. Findings are reported as facts and exceptions.
It is not
- A financial audit
- A valuation or appraisal
- A legal opinion on title or lien priority
- Investment advice
Independence rules
- The inspector holds no interest in the borrower, the lender, the hardware or the loan.
- Fees are fixed per engagement. They never depend on the result or on the loan closing.
- The inspector does not arrange, broker or recommend financing.
- Any relationship that a reasonable lender would want to know about is disclosed in the report.
Where a procedure touches a legal question, the inspector records what the documents and counterparties say. The legal conclusion is left to the lender's counsel.
Limitations stated in the standard
- The inspection reports conditions on the inspection dates. It does not warrant them afterwards.
- A sample can miss an exception outside it. The sampling is disclosed in every report.
- Hardware attestation confirms that a device is genuine and which device it is. It does not confirm who owns it or where it is.
- The inspector relies on third-party confirmations as given and identifies their source.
05 Status
Current status
As at 22 November 2026, the service is in pilot preparation. No client engagement has been carried out yet. The inspection standard is at version 0.1, a draft for review.
The on-chain part is a prototype for Flare's Coston2 testnet. The contracts have unit tests and have not been deployed to the testnet yet. The prototype uses invented data and involves no real funds. It is not in production and has not been reviewed by a third party.
Flare Confidential Compute is not on Flare mainnet, and Flare has published no date for it. The prototype's demo uses a test machine with no enclave. Confidentiality is the design and has not been demonstrated.
State of each part
| Part | State |
|---|---|
| Inspection standard | Version 0.1 drafted. Review and correction are next. Proposed numbers are to be fixed in version 0.2 |
| Inspection and report | Need no blockchain. The report template is not done yet. No pilot inspection has been signed |
| Serial collector and report builder | Prototype. Works on recorded sample output with invented data, not on a live host |
| Proof registry and loan-gate contracts | Prototype for the Coston2 testnet, with unit tests. Not deployed yet. No mainnet configuration exists |
| Confidential Compute extension | In development. The end-to-end demo has not been run yet. It will use a test machine with no enclave |
Phases
The on-chain part waits on Flare, so the phases are tied to conditions on Flare's side and not to dates. The inspection service runs off-chain and waits on nothing. This is a plan, not a record of work done.
| Phase | Network | Starts when | Done when |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0. Prototype | Coston2 testnet | Now | The demo runs end to end on invented data |
| 1. Canary pilot | Songbird | Flare opens custom extensions on Songbird | 90 days of proofs with no missed window, and one lender or vendor reading the feed |
| 2. Mainnet launch | Flare mainnet | Confidential Compute has its final security review, passes a governance vote and is live on Flare mainnet | A first loan draw or loan sale depends on the proof |
| 3. Scale | Flare plus other chains | Outside enclave operators and permanent operator rewards exist | No dependence on a single operator |
If Confidential Compute does not reach a final security review and a mainnet proposal, the plan is to deliver the same signed proof record through other chains or an established oracle network. The record format is chain-neutral for that reason.
06 Background
Background
The founder, Wessel Vosloo, has a background in industrial plant shutdown and turnaround management. That work is scope verification, readiness reviews, serial and work-order reconciliation, and working with inspection authorities.
The service is offered by Innovation Blockchain (Pty) Ltd.
07 Contact
Contact
Write to discuss the draft standard, a pilot inspection, or a field partnership. Comments on the proposed numbers are useful at this stage.
contact@innovationblockchain.app
There is no form. These pages set no cookies and load nothing from other hosts.